Call for Papers: Knowledge-that/knowledge-how: between phenomenology and analytic philosophy – Thematic dossier of Studia UBB Philosophia (Issue 3/2020)

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Distinctions between various kinds of knowledge (practical and theoretical, procedural and declarative, etc.) are age-old and common in philosophy. Ryle’s (1949) seminal approach defined and established today’s most hotly debated distinction of this type, that between knowledge-that (i.e., propositional knowledge) and knowledge-how. Ryle rejects what he calls, in a somewhat derogatory manner, intellectualism, that is, the view that all knowledge, including knowledge-how, is propositional. Ryle’s view remained largely unchallenged until Stanley and Williamson’s 2001 paper titled ‘Knowing How’. Stanley and Williamson proposed a linguistic argument that defended the view that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that and rejected Ryle’s famous regressive argument against intellectualism. Stanley and Williamson’s paper has been the starting point of a very animated and diverse debate concerning knowledge-how, that in recent years has largely shifted focus on the notion of skill. Not only Ryle’s perspective has been put under scrutiny by the new intellectualists, but prominent thinkers from the phenomenological tradition, such as Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus, are also the object of criticism in the series of papers written by Stanley alone or co-written by Stanley and other authors. Naturally, intellectualism has received numerous replies from various traditions and fields, both from analytic philosophers and phenomenologists, who have made use of various empirical studies and results, as well as older and newer philosophical theories and arguments. In this framework, ancient, medieval or just alternative models of knowledge and skill ranging from philosophy and psychology to computer science become relevant. Our aim in this issue is to bring together, as far as possible, the various traditions and approaches that have a bearing on the debate. Possible topics include (but are not limited to):

  • The (in)sufficiency of linguistic arguments for establishing theories about knowledge and cognition
  • The relation between knowledge (-how, -that, or knowledge in general) and skill. The relation between knowledge, intelligence, and intelligent action. Can we have non-propositional knowledge that is nevertheless intelligent in its manifestation? What determines when something is propositional?
  • The role of representations in defining knowledge and mediating between knowledge and action. Modes of presentation. Are modes of presentation fit to provide the interface between knowledge and action, as the intellectualist would want?
  • Accounts of knowledge in general and of various types of knowledge. What are the perspectives for compositional counterarguments to intellectualism? Should the difficulties encountered in specifying a strict demarcation between types of knowledge reflect back on the concept of knowledge itself?

 

Papers should be written in English. Their length should be between 5000 and 8000 words. The papers should be accompanied by a short abstract written in English (maximum 300 words), 3-8 keywords and a short biography of the author(s).

Submitted papers should be sent as attachments in an e-mail message with the subject “KNOWLEDGE-THAT-KNOWLEDGE-HOW-SUBMISSION” to the following address:

copoeru@hotmail.com in “.doc”, “.docx” or “.rtf” format.

For more information on the general submission guidelines: https://studiaphilosophia.wordpress.com/indication/.

Deadline for submission: Sept. 15th, 2020.

The special issue will be guest-edited by dr. Mihai Rusu and dr. Adrian Luduşan. Please direct any inquiries concerning this supplement to mihaimcrusu@gmail.com, adiludusan@gmail.com.

Burdened Children 1930 by Paul Klee
Burdened Children 1930 by Paul Klee

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